Introduction
It seems that every year the Bowl Championship Series (or BCS) comes under fire. In 2008-09, Florida (13-1) beat Oklahoma (12-2) to win the putative national championship. No one disputes that Florida and Oklahoma were among the nation's best teams, but Utah (13-0), and Texas (12-1) all feel they deserved a shot at the title. Indeed, Texas even beat Oklahoma in a regular season game.
In place since 1998, the BCS purports to determine the national champion in college football, while preserving the century-old system of postseason bowl games. To make its determination of which teams go to the championship game, the BCS employs the USA Today Coaches Poll, the Harris Interactive College Football Poll and an average of six computer 1 rankings. Without fail, the annual selection invites strident criticism.
Invariably, many fans and colleges feel cheated.
This year, the president of the United States is also weighing in. 
President
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In fact, out of nearly 80 other collegiate varsity championships, Division IA football 1 is the only one in which a winner is not determined through some kind of playoff-bracket system.
Historical Background
The Rose Bowl became the first college bowl game in 1902. It became a regular annual event in 1916. Most major bowl games have been in place since the 1930s.
College bowl games generally are organized and controlled by local chambers of commerce, convention and tourist bureaus and assorted businesses. The bowl games' understood purpose is to generate business for the local economy, which they usually do to some extent because the majority of attendees come from out of town. 2 The bowls have contracts 1 DIA has been unfelicitously renamed Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and DIAA is now Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), leaving the linguistical puzzle: why does the championship game occur in the FBS, and not the FCS?
2 Interestingly, early on the bowl organizing committees claimed their purpose was to raise money for charity. Sperber describes the situation in the late 1940s: "In reality, the bowls ran a huge financial shell game. The top with individual conferences that provide for conference champions, runnerups or other designated teams to participate in the bowl each year. On behalf of the conference, the participating school gets a share of the bowl revenue and, in turn, is obligated to purchase a substantial block of tickets for the game which it attempts to resell to its alumni, students, boosters and others.
Under this system, historically each bowl did not know the quality of the teams it would be getting until the end of the season. networks were souring on the bowl business. We couldn't go one more cycle where we wake up on the 1 st of December and find out that we have a bad matchup and that we were going to get hammered in the ratings." 3 Under the circumstance, selling ad spots for top dollar was next to impossible.
The other significant consequence of these arrangements was that it was next to impossible to structure a national championship. Between 1935 and 1991, the top-two ranked teams met each other in a bowl game only eight times. 4 It would have had to have been a coincidence that the top two teams were in the two conferences playing in a given bowl game. From the perspective of the Bowl Alliance conferences, there was still one missing piece. The champions of the Big 10 and Pac-10 conferences had been matched in the Rose Bowl for over 50 years. Moreover, teams from these conferences were often ranked either first or second in the nation.
Without the Big 10 and Pac-10, the Alliance goal to offer a national championship game every year was elusive.
In June 1996, the Alliance struck a deal with the Big 10, the Pac-10, the Rose Bowl and ABC (which had broadcasting rights to the Rose Bowl.)
Beginning with the 1998-99 season, the national championship game would rotate among the four bowls and ABC would have broadcast rights for all four games over a seven-year period (for which the network paid the estimated modest sum of $700 million, or $25 million per game which was roughly 2.5 times the average 1996 rights fees for the four games). 6 The with a minimum of eight wins or ranked higher than the lowest-ranked conference champion from among the champions of the ACC, Big East, Big As the ongoing inequities in the system were revealed and challenged politically, the BCS administrators modified the plan. Between 1998 and 2008, the BCS selection process has become incrementally more open and the revenue distribution marginally less unequal. Thus, the system to date has avoided legal challenges or congressional action. Nevertheless, the BCS system remains fundamentally closed and acutely unequal, as will be detailed in the ensuing discussion.
The Functioning of the Bowl System
Beyond the BCS, of course, there is a plethora of post-season bowl games. Indeed, there has been a steady proliferation of bowl games since the 1930s, as the table below shows. Slive's three-part explanation is the standard defense. The first point is that if the FBS went to a playoff system, then it would interfere with the integrity of the educational process. Presumably, the substance behind this point is that if there were an 8-team playoff, then some schools would have to play two additional games in January beyond what they play in the current arrangement; or three additional games if there were a 16-game playoff.
Number of Post-Season Bowl Games
Adding more games to the season would require more time away from classes for the football student-athletes.
The second point is that introducing a playoff system would undermine the integrity of the regular season. Here the substance is less apparent, but the reasoning goes something like this: in a playoff system, a school might qualify for a berth before it completed its season; in the present bowl system, qualification for the national championship game depends on a school's performance in all of its games, via the BCS rating system. In the case of qualification for the playoffs occurring before the season's end, the qualifying team may not make an all-out effort to win in its last game. It is asserted that this would be less likely to happen under the BCS arrangement.
The third point is that there is unique tradition and historical value to the bowl system. A bowl culture has emerged around this system that works commercially as well as emotionally, and it would be risky to tinker with it.
Response to the BCS Rationale
The first point is frequently met with derision by BCS detractors. something that is not an explicit concern nor necessary outcome of the BCS process.
Either way, the response to this concern is clear and compelling: the same problem inheres to all U.S. professional and college team sports, and in all other cases the leagues and the fans have shown a clear preference for the playoff system. One does not hear NFL fans calling for a one-game championship, with team selection based on a numerical ranking system, to replace the current multi-tiered playoff system, so that the possibility that a first place team would not make a full effort during its last game could be avoided.
The argument about the tradition of bowl games is rarely fleshed out.
The most persuasive explanation I have heard goes something like this.
Under the current bowl system there is a one-week, one-venue postseason.
This enables students, boosters and other fans to make one trip to one southern city during the Christmas and interterm break. 
Critique of the BCS Ranking System
When the BCS ranking system was first introduced in 1997, it contained four distinct elements which were then averaged to produce the overall rankings. Since that time the system has been changed in one way or another at least seven times. 23 The BCS likes the public to believe that these tweaks are part of perfecting the system. The reality appears to be rather The BCS has never publicly discussed nor identified these possible desiderata. In economists' jargon, if an objective function isn't specified, then maximization makes no sense.
The lack of conceptual clarity is then aggravated by the periodic shifts in the formula. Notably, in 2000, as in many years, the first choice for the national championship game was obvious; the second choice was ambiguous and hotly disputed. Oklahoma got the first nod. be approximately 4 points per game. 25 If college football fans are to be stuck with the BCS system to determine the national championship, the least the BCS could do is devise a less politically-driven and more statistically robust ranking system.
Finally, the coaches' poll itself has been subjected to sharp criticism.
The fundamental concern is that coaches have a potential conflict of interest when they cast their votes. They also see a small number of the eligible schools in action, so there are questions about the empirical basis upon which coaches' form their evaluations. There is also evidence of a bias toward teams that coaches have observed first hand.
Antitrust Considerations
Does the BCS violate U.S. antitrust laws and is it vulnerable to an antitrust challenge? As anyone familiar with the record of antitrust litigation in this country knows, there is always substantial uncertainty in such matters.
Part of the uncertainty results from the merits of the case, but a significant part of it results from the venue of the challenge, the judge and the jury My discussion concentrates on the final consumers.
27 NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) .
importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law." 28 The Court concluded: "Today we hold only that the record supports the District Court's conclusion that, by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted, rather than enhanced, the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life." 29 (emphasis mine).
As it pertains to the BCS, these are the key precepts from the 1984 decision. They lead to the following fundamental question. Can it be shown that there is a horizontal combination that restricts output, distorts prices, and drives resource allocation away from maximizing consumer welfare?
That there is a horizontal combination among the 65 BCS schools is not in question. The only question is whether this combination is incidental and necessary to developing a national championship; and, if it is, whether it 28 NCAA 468 U.S. at 108. Notably, in another part of the decision, the Court gets its economic analysis wrong. "The television plan protects ticket sales by limiting output -just as any monopolist increases revenues by reducing output." NCAA 468 U.S. at 117. Monopolists operate on the elastic portion of their demand curves, so when they reduce output and raise price, their revenue declines. The trick is that costs decline more rapidly than revenue, enabling profit maximization.
29 NCAA 468 U.S. at 120. If the playoff were effectively organized, it seems that the only practical issue would not be whether it attracted more eyeballs and created more revenue, but whether, given the diminished share of the overall take going to the BCS schools, it generated more net revenue for the BCS schools.
The BCS response to this argument would probably be that the wrong standard is being applied. The BCS should not be compared to some future hypothetical playoff system, but rather to the system that prevailed prior to Since that time, the BCS has made it marginally easier for non-BCS schools to play in a BCS bowl. Hence, the BCS can argue that each step it has taken has been toward opening competition, rather than shutting it down. From this perspective, the BCS is procompetitive.
This is a substantial argument. Yet, the previous system was itself a network of exclusive dealing contracts that also probably violated the antitrust laws, so going from one anticompetitive system to another does not make the latter procompetitive.
The question remains whether the BCS is engaging in ongoing exclusionary acts to curtail greater competition. At least four antitrust claims might be advanced against the BCS in this regard. The first is a Section One claim of unlawful boycott or concerted refusal to deal, i.e., a collective action by a group of competitors for the purpose of excluding or otherwise interfering with a potential competitors' access to the market in which they compete. For such a claim to prevail, the plaintiff must prove harm to competition and consumer welfare, not just harm to an individual competitor.
The second is a Section Two, or attempt to monopolize, claim. Given the Supreme Court's finding in International Boxing v. United States, the case could be made that the BCS is attempting to monopolize the market of college championship football. Here, the argument could be that the BCS conferences are allowing access to the market, but they are not doing it in an objective, non-discriminatory manner. As such, they have the specific intent to exercise monopoly control over this market. The third claim is related and usually represents a more problematic legal path to pursue. It could be argued that the BCS is an essential facility and without fair access to the facility, it is impossible for potential competitors to enter the market. 31 The fourth claim might be challenging the rule that limits the non-BCS conferences to one automatic appearance in a BCS bowl as a restraint of trade.
Such a rule will produce inferior BCS matchups if the second non-BCS school is stronger than one of the selected BCS teams
The BCS may also be vulnerable to claims of price fixing. Each of the 5 BCS bowl games, including the national championship, carry the same payout to the participating teams. This is so despite the fact that the national championship game regularly has the strongest ratings by a healthy margin and some of the remaining BCS games have considerably higher ratings than
others, yet the payout is identical to all bowls regardless of ratings or attendance. 
Pursuing Legislation, Not Litigation
The evolving jurisprudence on antitrust has made the pursuit of litigation increasingly difficult and enormously costly. The problematic antitrust landscape is compounded by the schizophrenic existence of college sports. The NCAA and its members have been successful in being legal chameleons -depending on the exigencies at hand, either purveyors of an extracurricular educational activity or sellers of big-time sports entertainment.
With this confusion, the law has often given college sports a pass, no doubt because big-time college sports is so popular with the public, making radical change of the status quo politically unacceptable to most courts. Until now, attacking the BCS has also been too politically perilous for most legislators, but the new administration may embolden a few key members of Congress to awaken from their slumber.
It seems apparent that the NCAA will not be motivated to initiate a plan for a postseason playoff. Indeed, the NCAA President, Myles Brand, has stated that the NCAA has no interest in a postseason FBS playoff. The BCS conferences dominate the Association's governing structure. For instance, even though the 65 BCS schools represent less than 7 percent of the NCAA's membership, they occupy 5 of the 18 seats (28 percent) of the seats on the Association-wide Executive Committee and even though the BCS schools comprise less than 20 percent of the Division I membership, they hold 6 of the 18 (33 percent) seats on the Division I Board of Directors.
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Beyond this, the BCS schools represent the commercial and revenuegenerating might of the NCAA. If the NCAA attempts to compete with the BCS conferences via a postseason football playoff for the national title, the expectation is that the BCS conferences would withdraw from the NCAA.
This would effectively undermine the NCAA's power in intercollegiate sports. Therefore, the NCAA would need exhortation, guidance and support from the courts or congress before it would organize a football playoff system.
There are multiple ways that Congress could address legislation to promote a football playoff. Perhaps the most direct would be to introduce legislation that withdraws the tax preferences for intercollegiate athletics, 39 if the NCAA does not initiate a championship playoff.
It might be helpful if such legislation also gave the NCAA a limited antitrust exemption so that it could require member schools, if selected, to participate in its playoff structure. The BCS conferences now require their schools to participate in bowls when selected. To be sure, mandatory 38 Of course, the 65 BCS schools also represent a majority of schools within Division IA (FBS) and are unlikely to vote away their privileged status. 39 These preferences are discussed in ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS. Ch. 6 (2001) .
participation requirements are problematic as they restrict potential competition. If one concludes, however, that the college football championship system constitutes a natural monopoly, then such a participation requirement would not be problematic.
Alternatively, the legislation could bypass the NCAA and set up a National Sports Commission. The commission could establish its own college football championship, and perhaps fulfill other oversight functions in the sports world as well, including drug testing. After all, if sports leagues are natural monopolies, economic theory teaches us that it is more efficient to regulate them than to break them up.
The legislative details would be easy enough to work out, if Congress has the will to act. The central argument in this piece is that a true national championship in college football has been held hostage by a football cartel of the six equity conferences in the BCS. Breaking apart this cartel is too important to leave to the caprices of our legal system and antitrust practice.
A national football playoff would increase output, redirect output to be more responsive to college football fans across the country, give broader opportunity to football players throughout the FBS, and assert a commitment to the basic principles of fairness that inhere to the ideals of democratic governance.
Today, all FBS teams do not start out on a level playing field. 
